OCI No. 2482/63

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Office of Current Intelligence 9 December 1963

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Guerrilla Activity in the Dominican Republic

## SUMMARY

The Dominican Government appears to have nipped in the bud a guerrilla effort planned and staffed for the most part by members of the pro-Castro "14th of June Political Group" (APCJ). Apparently the insurgents were surprised in their mountain hideouts before they were fully prepared to begin harassment of government troops. The would-be guerrilla movement reportedly was designed to demonstrate the present government's "instability," but in this instance, at least, it failed to attract the support of local peasants and dissident military ele-The rebels may also have anticipated receiving direct assistance from Cuba after establishing a foothold but there is no evidence that such support has yet been forthcoming. While the Dominican Government appears to have contained this particular uprising, continued political and economic unrest could result in new and larger insurgent operations which might prove difficult to contain.

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at from a few thousand up to 100 thousand members and supporters.

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(Although APCJ members provided most of the leadership and manpower for the current incidents, at least one member of the Dominican Popular Movement (MPD), a smaller, pro-Castro Communist-dominated party, has been reported captured. MPD members are said to have smuggled and assembled parts of automatic rifles produced at a Dominican factory for use by the guerrillas.) Popular sympathy for the APCJ -- which has been calling itself the "14th of June Revolutionary Movement" (MR-14J) since the current fighting began--stems from its earlier role as a nonpartisan underground group which fought against dictator Trujillo. After Trujillo's assassination, the leftist faction gained control of the party, but the name still has a certain appeal in the country, although few Dominicans are avowedly pro-Castro or pro-Communist. The APCJ/

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been anticipating and preparing for an eventual guerrilla-type uprising against the government ever since extreme leftists gained control of the organization. These preparations have reportedly included the acquisition and stockpiling of weapons from the armed forces and from individuals and organizations which possessed them under the Trujillo dictatorship.

4. There is no evidence that the Castro regime has been furnishing direct guidance or material support to the Dominican guerrilla forces. However, a Dominican fishing boat captured by Dominican authorities on 8 December contained a small amount of arms and explosives and four Dominican extreme leftists, two of whom were reported to be in Cuba in mid-October

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established in the mountains, the Dominican insurgents were to receive assistance from Cuba. Clearly Castro's guerrilla warfare against the Batista regime furnished the inspiration for the type of struggle planned by APCJ leaders. A measure of Cuban direction of or advice to the Dominicans presumably has been received indirectly through a few APCJ members who have received guerrilla warfare training in Cuba.

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At least some form of communication may exist between the Dominican rebels and Havana, because Cuba's Prensa Latina has given fairly heavy coverage to the "insurrection" in the Dominican Republic. (Havana's Prensa Latina propaganda agency quotes the most recent edition of the clandestine APCJ party newspaper as stating that 317 guerrillas are operating in six separate areas of the country, but these claims cannot be confirmed at this time.)

5. US-trained Dominican ground forces appear to have closed in on the rebels with little resistance, only one soldier having been reported killed in action. Dominican Air Force jets have fired rockets into the areas of guerrilla activity to demoralize the insurgents, although one pilot "defected" to Puerto Rico rather than fire on fellow Dominicans. However, at least part of the armed forces' success may be attributable to the guerrillas' lack of preparedness. Once discovered, the guerrillas were further deterred from fighting by the lack of military defections to their cause.

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sustained guerrilla ellort could put considerable strain on the severely limited mobility, communications, and equipment of the Dominican military and police forces.

Any immediate threat posed by the guerrillas seems to have been ended. The failure of the insurgents to attract popular support, and the subsequent capture of some of their principal leaders, weapons, and equipment should discourage further efforts for the time being. On the other hand, while Dominican extreme leftists have shown little disposition or capability for fighting government troops, their exclusion from legal political activity may encourage them toward increased violence. Similarly, if official harassment of moderate leftist and other antigovernment elements continues, any promising insurgent force might expect to attract a significant number of recruits. In short, while it cannot be predicted as likely in the near future, any sustained guerrilla activity in the Dominican Republic could pose a serious threat to internal security. (Map)

-4-

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